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MUTUAL ASSENT IN UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
SINCE THE RESTATEMENT
ARTHUR ANDERSON

COURT said in 192 2: "A unilateral contract isexactly as impossible as any other one-sided thing of two sides."' Twenty years
later another court said:
When a person makes an offer, he can couch it in such terms that it may be
accepted by a promise, express or implied, so that a bilateral contract arises,
executory on both sides. Or he may so frame his offer that it can be accepted
only by an act, so that a unilateral contract is formed, executory on the part of
2
the offerer alone.

The former quotation came before, and the latter quotation came
after, the publication of the Restatement of Contracts in 1932. The
contrast is dramatic, but the former statement, of course, does not
accurately picture the state of the pre-Restatement law of unilateral
contracts, and the analysis since the Restatement is not always as good
as the latter statement might imply. Likewise, the teachings and treatises of Williston3 have probably been more influential than the Restatement in bringing about the improvement which has occurred in
the analysis of unilateral contract law. But the Restatement is important
and is growing more so, and the date of its publication is accordingly
taken here as the starting point in an examination of the modem
developments in mutual assent in unilateral contracts.
1 Railsback v. Raines, i o Kan. 220, 223, 203 Pac. 687, 688 (19zz).
2 Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel, 131 N.J. Eq. 523, 525, z6 A. 2d 171, 172 (Ch., 1942),

aff'd 133 N.J. Eq. 4o8, 3o A. zd zi (Ct. Err. & App., 1943).
s Williston, Contracts (st. ed., 192o); Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. by Williston and

Thompson, 1936).
MR.ANDERSON isProfessor of Law at De Paul University College of Law. He received his Pb.B., J.D. and ]S.D. at the University of Chicago, and is the author of
CASES ON CONTRACTS, 1950.
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I. OFFEREE'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFER

The matter of the offeree's knowledge of the offer required the
attention of a court in a related pair of very recent cases.4 A man had
been murdered in the District of Columbia, and a veterans' organization
and the District of Columbia each offered a separate reward for information leading to the arrest of the guilty parties. The police called
upon the plaintiff, who was the mother of a girl who was a friend of
Wheeler, a suspect. In response to questioning, the plaintiff told the
police that the daughter and Wheeler had left the city together. The
police asked for names and addresses of relatives, and the plaintiff
accordingly gave the name and address of a relative in South Carolina,
where the police arrested Wheeler, in the daughter's company, two
days later. The plaintiff did not learn of the rewards until after she had
given her information to the police.
After Wheeler's conviction, the plaintiff sued the veterans' organization and the District of Columbia in two separate law suits, both of
which came before the same court. In each case the principal defense
was that there was no contract because the plaintiff had no knowledge
of the offer when she gave her information.
In the first case, which was against the veterans' organization, the
court in a scholarly opinion followed the standard doctrine5 and denied
recovery, being careful to limit its holding to the situation of a privately-offered reward, saying: 6
So far as rewards offered by private individuals and organizations are concerned, there is little conflict on the rule that questions regarding such rewards
are to be based upon the law of contracts.
Since it is clear that the question is one of contract law, it follows that, at least
so far as private rewards are concerned, there can be no contract unless the
claimant when giving the desired information knew of the offer of the reward....

In the second case, which was against the District of Columbia, the
court likewise denied recovery, but it recognized a conflict in the
cases where the reward is to be paid by a governmental body or officer,
saying: 7
4 Glover v. Jewish War Veterans of the United States, 68 A. zd 233 (Mun. CA.,

D.C., 1949); Glover v. District of Columbia, 77 A. 2d 788 (Mun. C.A., D.C., 1951).
5 The court quoted from i Williston, Contracts S 33 (rev. ed., 1936); it also quoted
Rest., Contracts S 53, Comment a, in part, and illustration 1 (1932).
6 Glover v. Jewish War Veterans of The United States, 68 A. zd 233, 234 (Mun.
C.A., D.C., 1949).
7 Glover v. District of Columbia, 77 A. 2d 788, 790, 791 (Mun. C.A., D.C., 1951).
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The issue is now before us and we meet it by deciding that the rule applies to
governmental as well as private agencies (or individuals) under the circumstances of this case, and that one giving information leading to the arrest of a
criminal without any knowledge that a reward had been offered for such information is not entitled to collect the reward.
We have again examined the state decisions expressing the minority view....
We think that when rewards are offered by governmental agencies, no less than
when offered by private organizations, the rules of contract law apply and a
claimant is put to the necessity of showing that he knew of the offer and acted
upon it.

The court continued by distinguishing the "reward statute" cases,8
saying that such cases "rest on the theory that the right to the reward
follows by operation of law when compliance with the provisions of a
reward statute has been shown. This is not such a case." 9 With this
dictum, the court completes a very satisfactory analysis of the three
familiar situations involving knowledge of the existence of the reward.
II. NECESSITY OF INTENT TO ACCEPT

The New York Court of Appeals squarely held in the 1941 case of
Reynolds v. Eagle Pencil Co.,10 that there is no contract if the offeree
of an offer for a unilateral contract performs the act without the intent
to act upon the offer. The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, had
been assaulted by a group of pickets and strikers. The defendant
offered a reward "for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of any person or persons responsible" for the assault. The plaintiff testified without contradiction that he learned of the offer on the morning of its publication, and the same afternoon he gave information to a
detective which led to the arrest and conviction of one of the guilty
parties, but apparently his motive for giving the information was to
bring about the punishment of his assailant. A finding of fact was made
8The court cited Smith v. Nevada, 38 Nev. 477, 151 Pac. 512 (1915), where the state
legislature had enacted a special statute authorizing the governor to offer rewards in
connection with a particular crime, namely, the massacre of four ranchers by a band of
Indians. The Nevada court said, page 48z and 513: "The circumstances surrounding the
offer of reward in the case at bar are such, we think, that the legislature never contemplated that knowledge of the offer should be a prerequisite to a right to recover....
It may reasonably be assumed that the legislature had knowledge at the time of the
passage of the act that one or more posses were already in pursuit of the oudaws." Another case where it appears even more clearly that the right to the reward is noncontractual and "follows by operation of law," is Flood v. City National Bank, 218
Iowa 898, 253 N.W. 509 (1934), cert. denied 298 U.S. 666 (1936), where a state statute
entitled a finder of lost goods to recover a ten per cent reward from the loser.
9 Note 7 supra, at 791.
10z85 N.Y. 448, 35 N.E. zd 35 (I94'), rev'g 26o App. Div. 482, 23 N.Y.S. zd iot (ist
Dep't, 194o). The facts appear in the opinion of the Appellate Division.
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that he did not act upon the defendant's offer when he gave the information. The court said:"
We are thus constrained to determine plaintiff's legal right to the reward in
suit upon a basis which includes the fact that in giving information which led to
the arrest and conviction of his assailants the plaintiff did not act upon the
defendant's offer. That fact defeats the plaintiff's legal right to the reward.
The problem goes back to 1833 and the famous English case of Williams v. Carwardine,12 where the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover a reward for information leading to the discovery of
a murderer, even though the jury found that "she was not induced by
the offer of the reward, but by other motives." She had been severely
beaten by the murderer and she gave the information believing that she
had not long to live and to ease her conscience. The tenor of the judges'
opinions was that she should recover the reward because she had given
the information; Patteson, J. said: 13 "We cannot go into the plaintiff's
motives."
The very few American cases 14 took the view opposite to Williams v.
Carwardine, and they were followed by the Restatement,15 which
states: "If an act or forbearance is requested by the offeror as the
consideration for a unilateral contract, the act or forbearance must
be given with the intent of accepting the offer." The Restatement
argument seems conclusive: 16
When an offeror requests a certain act or forbearance as the consideration for
his promise, the act or forbearance when furnished is an ambiguous expression
of intent, since acts, like words, often have more than one objective meaning.
The reasonable interpretation may be that the offeree accepts the proposal, but
it is possible that the true interpretation is that the offeree as a free man has exercised his privilege of acting or forbearing in the manner requested, without
accepting the proposal. The only way to determine what his conduct actually
means, even objectively, is to ascertain his intent.

The holdings of the earlier American cases 7 plus the logic and standing of the Restatement plus the very high authority of the Reynolds
11 Reynolds v. Eagle Pencil Co., 285 N.Y. 448, 450, 35 N.E. 2d 35, 36 (x941).
12 4 B. & Aid. 62i (K.B., 1833).
13 Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Aid. 6z, 623 (K.B., 1833).
14 Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476 (i88o); Vitty v. Eley, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N.Y.S.
397 (4 th Dep't, rgoo). Accord: Sheldon v. George, 13z App. Div. 470, i6 N.Y.S. 969
( 4 th Dep't, 19o9) (alternative holding); cf. Gallagher v. Garrett, 144 Md. 241, 124 At.
898 (1923); 1 Williston, Contracts § 67 (rev. ed., 1936).
15 Rest., Contracts S 55 (1932).
16 Ibid., S 55, Comment a.
i Note 14 supra.
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case would seem to leave two points fully settled: (i) Williams v.
Carwardineis bad law, and (2) it is not the law in the United States.
A difference of opinion on these two points does exist, however, as is
shown by an examination of Volume i of Corbin's new treatise on the
law of contracts,'8 which appeared late in 195o.
Corbin states the facts of Williams v. Carwardinein the text of Sec-

tion 58, and continues with his discussion of the case in four succeeding
paragraphs. To avoid possible unfairness by a quotation out of context,
these four paragraphs are quoted in full, together with Corbin's footnotes, which, however, are re-numbered:
We shall not here attack this decision, although some courts have stated a
contrary opinion' 9 and some persons who have rendered the requested service
from other motives than a desire for the offered reward may forbear to seek the
20
reward or even refuse it when tendered. Generally, however, a bargaining

contract is explained as the result of mutual expressions of agreement or as
requiring the intentional acceptance of an offer. Like other definitions and rules,
these are rationalizations from the decided cases. They are useful; but they are
not consistent with all past court decisions and they do not necessarily control
future decisions. Contracts are not always consummated by the machinery of
offer and acceptance. If two persons repeat in unison, and in each other's presence, the terms of a contract prepared for them by a third person, they make a
valid contract. So also, if two persons simultaneously sign duplicate copies of a
contract prepared for them by a third person. In these cases, no doubt they are

consciously expressing mutual assent to the same terms; and usually the motive
of each is his desire for what the other gives or promises.
In another English case, 21 a dealer published an advertisement promising to
pay .ioo to anyone who should use his carbolic smoke ball according to directions for two weeks and thereafter catch the influenza. The plaintiff did as
requested and caught the influenza. Judgment was rendered for the bzoo. Without doubt the paramount motive of the offeror was the desire to make sales and

receive money. Probably the paramount motive of the plaintiff, the offeree, was
to gain immunity from a disease. If the plaintiff attained this chief object of
desire, he would receive no money at all. That these were the motives of offeror
and offeree did not prevent the formation of a valid unilateral contract.

Whatever the motive or motives may be, it is generally asserted that there
must be an expression of intention to agree upon definite terms. Even this, however, is not always true. If one person tenders delivery of a unilateral promise
under seal, there is a contract if the promisee receives the document; he need
i8 Corbin, Contracts 158 (1950).
19 Ibid., n. ii. "N.Y.-Vitty v. Eley, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N.Y.S. 397 (9oo) "
20 Ibid., n. 12. "The following item appeared in a newspaper: 'Little Rock, Ark., Dec.
,.-James Howard, convict who killed Tom Slaughter, notorious outlaw, in a communication to Gov. McRae today relieved the state from any and all obligations of paying him the $5oo reward offered for the apprehension and killing of Slaughter. Howard
declared that when he shot and killed the bandit he did not know that any reward had
been offered.'"
21 Ibid., n. t3. "Eng.-Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) Q.B. 256."
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not know its contents. Also when a debtor makes a new promise to pay a barred
debt, this22promise is a binding contract without any expression of assent by the
creditor.
In any case, it is certain that in rendering a requested performance it is not
necessary that the sole motive of the offeree shall be his desire for the offered
reward. It need not even be his principal or prevailing motive. The motivating
causes of human action are always complex and are frequently not clearly
thought out or expressed by the actor himself. This being true, it is desirable
that not much weight should be given to the motives of an offeree and that no
dogmatic requirement should be embodied in a stated rule of law.

In forbearing to attack Williams v. Carwardine,it would seem that
Corbin must necessarily be ready to attack Reynolds v. Eagle Pencil
Co. The Reynolds case, however, is not mentioned in his new treatise.
111. THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE

TO THE ACCEPTANCE

OF AN UNREVOKED

OFFER FOR A UNILATERAL CONTRACT

The doctrine of substantial performance was applied to the accept-

ance of an unrevoked 23 offer for a unilateral contract in Kaiser v. Better
Farms, Inc.,24 which was decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in 1946. The doctrine of substantial performance goes back to Lord
Mansfield's opinion in Boone v. Eyre25 in 1776, but it is a part of the law
of bilateral contracts. The application of this doctrine, by a court of
high standing, to an offer for a unilateral contract, is, therefore, a startling departure.
A detailed statement of the case is in order. The defendant-offeror
operated a farm of some 3,000 acres. The plaintiff-offeree had been
employed as a farm hand by the defendant for ten years. He "worked
and was paid by the day and was simply subject to being docked for the
days that he did not work. ' 26 Commencing in 1944, he was paid overtime for Sunday work. The offer was contained in a letter:
Ibid., n. 14. "See Restatement, Contracts, §§ 85-94."
The problem of the revocation of an offer for a unilateral contract after part performance has been much discussed. Some courts and writers, who have not been satisfied with the results which follow a strict adherence to principle, have formulated
special rules to be applied in such cases. These special rules will be discussed in the
next section of this paper, which deals with acceptance after attempted revocation, but
they are believed to be no part of the law where no revocation is attempted, and they
accordingly will not be mentioned in the present section.
24 249 Wis. 302, z4 N.W. zd 621 (1946).
25 i Hen. Bla. 273 (a), 1z6 Eng. Rep. 16o (1776).
23 Kaiser v. Better Farms, 249 Wis. 302, 306, 24 N.W. d 621, 623 (1946).
22

23
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June z8, 1944
To Better Farms Employees:
At this time when we are trying to operate our dairy barns, and get our field
work done with a shortage of help, we realize that everyone must work longer
hours and also much harder than in normal times.
In consideration of that fact if you will put forth every effort to co-operate
with us in getting the work done, and are still in our employ January ist, 1945,
a bonus of $50.00 will be paid to you.

Sincerely,
BETTER FARMs, INC.

CLARE F.

FILIATRAULT,

President

The plaintiff complied with this offer in all respects until January 1,

except that he did not work on July 4. One hundred acres of
alfalfa had been cut on July 3, and the foreman had "ordered plaintiff
and all of the help to work on July 4 th."'2 7 The plaintiff had asked
whether overtime would be paid and had been told that it would not.
Nine other men also failed to work on July 4, and the hay was damaged
1945,

by a heavy rainfall on July 5.

The defendant made no comment when the plaintiff returned to
work, and the plaintiff was not notified, until after the bonus period
had expired, that he would not receive the bonus.
The plaintiff sued for the $50, and the defendant counterclaimed
for one-tenth of the damage to the hay, contending that ten men customarily worked in the hay field, and that therefore one-tenth of the
damage was attributable to the plaintiff.
The court held, (i)that the plaintiff worked and was paid by the
day and therefore had committed no breach of his contract of employment. and that the counterclaim accordingly had been properly dismissed, and (z) that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the $5o bonus
in full.
The court held, in effect, that the underlying employment arrangement was something other than a bilateral contract binding the plaintiff to work on July 4.The non-binding quality of the underlying employment arrangement was the only reason given for sustaining the
dismissal of the counterclaim. If the bonus arrangement had resulted
in a bilateral contract, it would seem that it would have been necessary
for the court to discuss the application of the counterclaim to the
bonus arrangement. The court's failure to discuss the counterclaim
in relation to the bonus arrangement may accordingly be some evi27 Ibid., at 304 and 622.
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dence that the court did not regard the bonus arrangement as resulting in a bilateral contract.
The court's holding that the plaintiff could recover the $5o bonus is
the matter of primary interest, and, in connection therewith, the first
topics for discussion are (i) whether the court proceeded upon the
theory that the offer was for a unilateral contract, and (z) whether
the court employed the doctrine of substantial performance.
Unfortunately, it cannot be said to be crystal-clear that the court
regarded the offer as being for a unilateral contract. The court makes
no direct statement of its views as to the nature of the offer. The closest
that the court comes to describing the nature of the offer is to say, "It is
of importance that the offer, which contemplated acceptance by
performance, was never withdrawn. ' 28 This language is quite meaningful, however, because ( i ) only an offer for a unilateral contract is accepted by performance,29" and (2) only if this offer were for a unilateral
contract would mention of withdrawal be appropriate. 30 The foregoing considerations, plus the court's striking down of the counterclaim, justify the discussion to proceed upon the basis that the court
regarded the offer as being for a unilateral contract.
It is quite clear that the court employed the doctrine of substantial
performance in finally reaching its decision. The court said:"1
The precise question in this case is whether plaintiff's refusal to work on July
because he thought he ought to have overtime for that day is sufficient to
make his performance something less than substantial. On the part of defendant,
it is argued with considerable force that the hay was down; that there were
possibilities of rain, and that plaintiff knew or should have known the importance of getting in the hay, and that the default was so substantial as to prevent plaintiff's performance from being so.
Two factors lead us to reject this contention. In the first place, this was
4 th

28 Ibid., at 307 and 623.
"9 There is a real, but rarely observed, exception to this statement which is expressed
in 63 of the Restatement of Contracts as follows: "If an offer requests a promise
from the offeree, and the offerce without making the promise actually does or tenders
what he was requested to promise to do, there is a contract ... provided such perform-

ance is completed or tendered within the time allowable for accepting by making a
promise .... United States v. John A. Johnson Contracting Corp., 39 F. zd 274 (C.A.
'd, 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 797 (1944) (alternative holding). There is also an apparent, but not real, exception in the case of an offer for a bilateral contract where the
offeree makes his promise by acts or conduct orher than words. Linder v. Midland Oil
Refining Co., 96 Colo. 16o, 40 P. -d 253 (1935); Davis v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., [40
Kan. 644, 38 P. zd 107 (1934); Rest., Contracts § 21 (9-,.). It seems quite certain that
the court had neither of these two situations in mind.
30 If the offer had been for a bilateral contract, it undoubtedly would have been terminated by acceptance or lapse of time soon after it was miade on June 28.
31 Kai.eer v. Better Faris, 249 Wis. 302, ,to6, 24 NAV. d 6,1, 623 (1946),
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plaintiff's only default-the only instance in which it is even hinted that plaintiff
did not fully measure up to the requirements of the bonus. He worked long
hours, as well as Sundays and holidays. He performed his tasks with efficiency
and competency for all but a single day out of a period extending more than six
months. Quantitatively, his performance appears to us to have been substantial.
Further than this, the fourth of July incident occurred during the early part of
the bonus period.... Further than this, it ought to be pointed out that plaintiff's

failure to work on the 4th of July arose out of a difference of opinion between
plaintiff and the foreman as to whether plaintiff was entitled to overtime for
that day. It is not important for us to determine that plaintiff was right in his
contention, but it is evident from the record that he made the contention in good

faith, and that his failure to work did not have the quality of wilfulness which is
sometimes said to prevent performance from being substantial. See 3 Williston,
Contracts (rev. ed.), sec. 842.
The court reaches its conclusion that the default was not substantial
by examining and weighing the circumstances surrounding the default.
The court points out (i) that this was the plaintiff's only default,
(2) that his actual performance was large and good, (3) that his default
occurred early in the bonus period, and (4) that it considers that his
default was not wilful. This is the analysis which is made, and these are
the types of influences which are considered, when dealing with a bilateral contract and when attempting to decide whether a given breach
of promise is material or whether a given performance is substantial.32
The principles being applied by the court are further identified by its
citation of authority: Section 842 of Williston on Contracts is entitled, "Substantial performance as excusing condition requiring complete performance," and deals with substantial performance in bilateral contracts.
The doctrine of substantial performance has been a part of the law
of bilateral contracts for nearly two centuries. Lord Mansfield evolved
the doctrine in two decisions, of which the first was Kingston v. Preston,33 where he held that a non-performing plaintiff could not recover,3 4 and of which the second was Boone v. Eyre, where he held that
a non-performing plaintiff could recover if his breach was not material
and if his performance accordingly was substantial.3 5 This has been the
32W. H. Kirkland Co. v. King, 248 Ala. 643, 29 So. zd 141 (947); Midway School
District v. Griffeath, 29 Cal. id 13, 172 P. 2d 857 (946); Cassino v. Yacevich, 261 App.

Div. 685, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 95 ( 3 d Dep't, i941); Hetkowski v. School District, 141 Pa.

Super. 5z6, 15 A. 2d 4 70 (r 94 o); Tichnor Bros. v. Evans, 92 Vt. 278, 1o2 At. 1o31 (918);
Rest., Contracts §§ 274, 275 (1932); 3 Williston, Contracts S§ 841-844 (rev. ed., 1936).
33a Doug. 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (1773).
34 3 Williston, Contracts § 817 (rev. ed., 1936).

35 Ibid., at §818.
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law ever since. The Restatement of Contracts describes this body of
law as the doctrine of "Promises for an agreed exchange," 6 and proceeds upon the fundamental proposition that in every bilateral contract the parties contemplate an exchange of performances, with the
result that performance by the defendant is constructively conditional
upon substantial performance by the plaintiff. The Restatement expresses the same doctrine in another way,3 7 that is, by stating that a
material breach by the plaintiff discharges the defendant's duty to give
the agreed exchange. The doctrine is the heart of the modem law of
bilateral contracts, and it is believed that it has never before been
applied to an offer for a unilateral contract. 8
An offer for a unilateral contract is accepted by performance of the
act, and this means the whole act.39 The Restatement" states that "an
acceptance must comply exactly with the requirements of the offer,
36

Rest., Contracts § 266 (1932).

Ibid., at S 274.
38 The law of unilateral contracts does contain a doctrine which bears a superficial
37

resemblance to the doctrine of substantial performance, but which is not the same. It
applies to offers for rewards. i Williston, Contracts S 74 n. 2 (rev. ed., 1936), refers to
it as "the so-called doctrine of 'substantial compliance' with the terms of the offer."
A leading case is Haskell v. Davidson, 91 Me. 488, 4o Atl. 330 (1898), where a reward
was offered "for the arrest and conviction of the person or persons who entered the
room of Alexander W.Vilson, and stole $35 therefrom." The plaintiffs investigated the
crime, confronted the thief with the charge, and obtained his confession, but the actual
arrest was made by a deputy sheriff and the actual conviction was made by the judicial
branch of the state government. The court allowed the plaintiffs to recover the reward,
saying: "An offer of a reward for 'the arrest and conviction' of an offender, can not be
taken literally.... The service contemplated by a person making such an offer, and
which his proposal should be construed as meaning, must be, the obtaining and giving
to some proper person interested, sufficient information in relation to the perpetrator
of the crime and his whereabouts as to authorize and secure the arrest of the offender,
and subsequently to procure his conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction ...
Xe think that.., the plaintiffs substantially performed the service required by the
offer of reward, so as to accomplish the entire object contemplated and desired by
those making it." In Marsh v. Wells Fargo & Company Express, 88 Kan. 538, 129 Pac.
r68 (1913 ), the reward was "for the arrest and conviction of" a murderer; the plaintiff
arrested Carr and Cart was convicted. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover the
reward, saying: "It cannot be said that in a strict literal sense any particular person or
persons convicted Carr. That was accomplished through the co-operation of the plaintiff, the special agents of the company, and the prosecuting officers; the court, jury
and witnesses also performed appropriate functions in bringing about the result....
Offers must in such cases be liberally construed in the sense in which they are ordinarily
understood and acted upon and the purposes for which they are intended. A substantial compliance is sufficient." What the court has done in each of these two cases
has been to read and interpret the offer and then to hold that the plaintiff has done
everything that the offer, as interpreted, requires. The court does not, it is believed, say
that the plaintiff recovers on less than full performance.
39 1Villiston, Contracts § 73 (rev. ed., 1936).
4
0 Rest., Contracts 5 59 (932).
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omitting nothing from the.. performance requested." These words
"exactly" and "nothing" are precise. The Comment goes on to say,
"This rule is a necessary corollary of the basic idea of contracts that
duties are imposed for only such performance as the parties have expressed a willingness to render."
In the present case, the defendant made an offer for a unilateral contract. It offered to pay a bonus of $So for the plaintiff's act of putting
forth "every effort to co-operate with us in getting the work done."
The plaintiff did not perform that act, but instead absented himself
from the hay field on July 4,which was a day when he was needed to
get the work done. There was a non-compliance with the requirements
of the offer, and an omission from the performance requested.
The court held that the plaintiff's performance was substantial 1 and
that he therefore should recover the bonus, just as any nonperforming
plaintiff recovers on a bilateral contract when his performance is substantial. The court allowed recovery of the entire $5o, and not some
lesser amount, and the court did not explain the place that was to be
occupied in its theory by a rule which is basic to the doctrine of substantial performance, namely, the rule that a plaintiff, whose performance is merely substantial rather than complete, is subject to suit
in a cross action for damages for breach of his own promise.4 2 If the
bonus arrangement had been a bilateral contract, in which the plaintiff
promised to put forth every effort to co-operate in exchange for the
defendant's promise to pay the bonus, the plaintiff would have recovered the bonus upon substantial performance, but he would have
been liable for damages for breach of contract to the extent that his
substantial performance was less than full performance. The defendant
would have been able, in effect, to deduct such damages from the $50,
and his net payment to the plaintiff would have been something less
than $50. It does not appear that any existing rule of law would permit
any similar deduction from the liability of the maker of an offer for a
41 The court argued, in part, that the plaintiff contended in good faith that he was
entitled to overtime pay, and that his default accordingly lacked "the quality of wilfulness." Wilfulness is an influential circumstance when appraising a performance to determine whether it is substantial. But an experienced farm hand, such as the plaintiff,
knows when he takes the job that certain farm operations demand performance at the
appropriate time: cows must be milked twice a day seven days a week, and hay must
be made when the sun shines. This plaintiff, however, at a critical time, followed, or
accompanied, or led nine other men away from the hay fields in a dispute over overtime, not regular, pay. Viewed in this light, the plaintiff's default appears quite wilful,
particularly when he sues for a bonus promised for extra effort.
42Rest., Contracts 5 275, Comment a (1932); Ibid., § 313 , Comment C; 3 Williston,
Contracts § 841 (rev. ed., 1936).
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unilateral contract. Certainly, the offeree is not a promisor and he cannot be held for breach of promise; certainly, also, the law cannot put a
different promise into the offeror's mouth-not even a smaller one.
Whether the decision will be followed remains to be seen. There is
something engaging about a rule which does not require the exact, but
instead issatisfied with the almost, and this new point of view may have
a future in a law of contracts which has on other occasions embraced a
doctrine not strictly in accord with logic. If this new point of view
does develop, however, some provision must be made for reducing the
amount of the offeror's net liability where he receives substantial, rather
than complete, performance of the act for which he bargained. How
this provision will be made will be interesting to observe.
IV. ACCEPTANCE AFTER REVOCATION

Before the Restatement, most of the discussion of the revocation
problem in offers for unilateral contracts took place in the law reviews,
the treatises, and the classrooms. The judicial discussions were infrequent and sometimes unsatisfactory.
The pre-Restatement academic discussion centered around the feeling that the standard doctrine, as laid down by Langdell,"4 which
would permit an offeror to revoke after the offeree had performed a
part of the act, might lead to hardship and injustice. Langdell's suggestion, that the parties could have made a bilateral contract instead and
had only themselves to blame for any possible hardship, did not satisfy.
Other solutions were offered. Ashley suggested that some kind of an
estoppel be invoked to bar revocation; 44 McGovney suggested the
collateral-offer-not-to-revoke theory; 45 Ballantine suggested the concept of a uni-promissory obligation formed by the beginning of the
performance of the act. 46 Wormser defended the standard doctrine,
saying that the offeree was not bound to perform the act and therefore
the offeror should be free to revoke his offer.4 7 The academic discussion included .a vigorous criticism of the 1902 case of Los Angeles
Traction Co. v. Wilshire,48 where the court held that an offer for a uni4

3 Langdell, A Summary of the Law of Contracts S 4 (zd ed. i88o).

44

Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other than a Counter Promise, 23 Harv.

L. Rev. 159 (19to).

McGovney, Irrevocable Offers-Part II, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 654 (1914).
Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial Performance
of Service Requested, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 94 (i921).
47 Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 Yale L. J. 136 (1916).
4835 Cal. 654,67 Pac. io86 (1901).
45
46
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lateral contract, plus part performance of the act, yielded a bilateral
contract.

Williston's viewpoint was expressed in
follows:

1920,

in his First Edition, as

It seems impossible on theory successfully to question the power of one who
offers to enter into a unilateral contract to withdraw his offer at any time until
performance has been
completed by the offeree, though obvious injustice may
arise in such a case. 49
The leading case of the pre-Restatement period was Petterson v.
Pattberg,50 where the Court of Appeals of New York adhered to the

standard doctrine and allowed an offeror to revoke his offer through a
closed door while the offeree was outside anxious to accept.
In 1932 came the Restatement and its Section 45:
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration
requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the
offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is
conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered within the time
stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time.

In declaring that the offeror was bound as soon as a part of the consideration had been given, the Restatement departed from the standard
doctrine. It was argued in support of the Section that "the courts generally by some form of argument hold that the offer cannot be terminated," and that "justice is best served by the rule stated."51 For this
departure, the law has not been grateful: Section 45 has been cited in
fourteen cases, but not one of them can properly be regarded as a case
52
which actually applies the Restatement rule.
49

iWilliston, Contracts S 6o (ist ed., 192o).

50 248 N.Y. 86, 161 N.E. 428 (1928).

51 Rest., Contracts, Explanatory Notes § 45 (Official Draft, Chap. 1-7, 1928).
r, Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn & Co., 67 F. ad 459 (C.A. 1st, 1933)
(handled by the
court as a bilateral contract); Campbell v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 96 F. Supp. x89
(W.D. Pa., 1951) (court says it might construe the contract as either bilateral or unilateral, and that the outcome would be the same under either construction); Cohen v.
Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Pa., 1950) (court cites Section 45 in a dictum on implied
contracts, but says there was no implied contract in the case); McManus v. Newcomb,
61 A. 2d 36 (Mun. C.A., D.C., 1948) (real estate broker, who never found a buyer, recovered a commission when owner violated terms of exclusive agency); Lyon v. Goss,
19 Cal. ad 659, 123 P. ad i1 (1942) (bilateral contract and lease); Ruess v. Baron, lo P.
2d 518 (Cal. App., [932) (the District Court of Appeal cited § 45 in holding an option
to be irrevocable, but in 217 Cal. 83, 17 P. 2d i19 (1932), the Supreme Court reversed,
and held that the option was revocable and that it had been revoked); American University v. Todd, 39 Del. 449, 1 A. ad 595 (Super. Ct., 1938) (a charitable subscription
was held to be not binding); 1. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E.
2d 532 (1938) (in an action upon a charitable subscription, the complaint was held to
state a cause of action, but there is no demonstration tat the specific facts required by
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Following the Restatement came the Revised Edition of Williston's
treatise, where the Restatement view is explained: 1a
A collateral contract to keep an offer open is in effect specifically enforced by
holding any attempt to revoke it ineffectual, so that the offeror becomes bound
from the time performance is begun by a contract, liability upon which is conditional on the completion by the offeree of the requested performance....

For present purposes, the academic discussion ended in 1938-9,
with an article by Llewellyn," wherein inter plurimahe suggested that
unilateral contracts were not entitled to be recognized as co-ordinate
with bilateral contracts. He said: "The great dichotomy in the ortho-

dox doctrine of Offer and Acceptance is that between bilateral and
unilateral contract;"" and
The suspicion is that that dichotomy represents doctrine divorced from life,
and therefore does not comfortably hold the cases, and therefore is misleading;
and that it spawns unnecessary difficulties. To be sure, no line of analysis can
properly be said to be wrong, merely because it divides mankind, say, into
such a dichotomy as those who are bearded ladies and those who are not. But
such a line of analysis does suggest the presence of more bearded ladies than
there are, which tends to mislead. And it raises questions as to just who is a
bearded lady, and what the consequences are of being one .... 56

Llewellyn went on to say that "it is not courts' business to be looking
for acts in contrast to promises, or for promises in contrast to acts. It is
their business to be looking for overt expression of agreement-any
overt expression of agreement. 5 7
If, as a consequence, the distinction between bilateral and unilateral
contracts is dropped, and if any overt expression of agreement is operative, the result would emerge that any offer might be accepted by

either the promise or the act. This result is of particular interest in conS 45 had occurred); Charles E. Quincy & Co. Arbitrage Corp. v. Cities Service Co., 156
Misc. 83, 282 N.Y. Supp. 294 (S. Ct., 1935) (an offering of stock by a corporation to
its debenture holders was held to be cancelable); Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165,
78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948) (complaint of real estate broker under exclusive right of sale
held to state a cause of action, although the broker never found a buyer); Bretz v.
Union Central Life Insurance Co., 134 Ohio St., 171, 16 N.E. 2d 272 (1938) (discussed
in the text, infra); Petroleum Research Corp. v. Barnsdall Refining Corp., 188 Okla.
62, 105 P. 2d 1047 (1940) (written bilateral contract); Tile-Rite Co. v. Hartsuff, 75 Pa.
D. & C. 127 (1950) (defendant relied upon Section 45, but the court allowed plaintiff
to recover); Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 3 Tenn. App. 490, 217
S.W. zd 6 (1946) (discussed in the text, infra).
53 1 Williston, Contracts S 6oA (rev. ed., 1936).
54 Liewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I and II, 48 Yale
L. J. 1,779 (1938-9).
55

Ibid., at

32.

56 Ibid., at 36.

57

Ibid., at 8o3.
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nection with two topics later to be discussed: (i) Llewellyn reached
this result to an extent in the Uniform Commercial Code, and (z) the
result emerged in fact in a 195o decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington, where the court squarely held that an offer for a unilateral
contract, plus a promise to do the act, yielded a bilateral contract.
Ironically, however, Llewellyn cannot be pleased with the decision, for
the outcome was most unfair.
The discussion of the revocation problem in unilateral contracts,
since 1938, has been mainly judicial rather than academic, and centers
in four outstanding cases. These four cases grow in interest in the
chronological order in which they were decided, and the amount of
space devoted herein to each of them will increase in the same order.
The first case is Bretz v. Union CentralLife Insurance Co.,58 decided
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1938. Union held a first mortgage in
the amount of $10,348, on Bretz' farm. In connection with a refinancing loan to be made by a federal lending agency, Union made a 9o-day
offer to Bretz to accept $8,ioo in full satisfaction. Bretz thereafter took
steps to complete the loan, such as to have a survey made and an abstract of title prepared. Twenty-eight days after making the offer,
Union revoked. Bretz tendered the $8, 1oo nearly two months after the
ninety days had expired, but Union refused to accept it. Bretz filed an
action for specific performance of Union's promise, but the court held
in favor of Union. The court quoted the Restatement definition of a
unilateral contract, and stated the standard doctrine in clearest language:
An offer, continuing or otherwise, to enter into a unilateral contract, unsupported by a valuable consideration, is not binding upon the offeror, and is revocable at his will at any time prior to its acceptance. Though time for acceptance
was prescribed, there was no obligation upon appellant to keep the offer open
for the remainder of the period, and the right to revoke it before its expiration,
if not accepted, is clear.... Nothing less than performance will tender acceptance, and until such time the right to revoke remains unimpaired.... The withdrawal of the offer was made before the promise therein contained became
binding.59

The lateness of the acceptance would have furnished the court a
different argument for the same decision, but in fact the court limited
itself almost exclusively to the argument that the offer had been effectively revoked.
" 134
59

Ohio St.

171, t6 N.E.

zd

27Z (1938).

Bretz v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 171, 175, t6 N.E. 2d

(1938).
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Bretz contended also that it was the revocation which had delayed

the consummation of the loan beyond the 9o-day period, but the court
disposed of that contention, too, in strict accordance with the standard
doctrine:
However, it is one thing for a party wrongfully to prevent performance of a
contract to which and by which he is bound and another thing for a party to
revoke his offer to which he is not bound. If revocation of an offer before
acceptance is at all an exercise of a legal right, it is of no moment that the effect
of revocation is to make acceptance by the offeree impossible. 6 0

The Bretz case is outstanding in containing a modem, judicial exposition of the standard doctrine.
The second case is Hutchinson v. Dobson-BainbridgeRealty Co.,"'

which was decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in 1946, and
approved and recommended for publication by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee in 1949. Defendant-owner appointed plaintiff-broker as
exclusive agent for 90 days to sell defendant's house, promising inter
alia to pay the full commission if the house should be sold by the defendant or any other broker during the period. Plaintiff spent time and
money trying to find a buyer, but never found one. Five days before
the 90 days expired, defendant sold the house through another broker.
Plaintiff brought suit for the full commission and recovered. The
court said:
( i ) It was an offer for a unilateral contract;
(2) The plaintiff62 "made no promise, did not agree to try to sell, but was free
to do as it chose.";
(3) The question is whether plaintiff's efforts constituted an acceptance;
(4) Some authorities hold that "the offeror may revoke his offer at any
moment before full performance, whatever the hardship that may result to the
offeree.";63

(5) "A greater number of courts, however, hold that part performance of the
consideration may make such an offer irrevocable .... ,,;64
(6) "We think this is the better rule. The theoretical difficulties, formidable
as they seem, are outweighed by considerations of practical justice.";6 5
(7) "This rule avoids hardship to the offeree, and yet does not hold the
offeror beyond the terms of his promise. It is true by such terms he was to be
bound only if the requested act was done; but this implies that he will let it be
done, that he will keep his offer open till the offeree who has begun can finish
60 Ibid., at 178 and 275.
01 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 SAV. 2d 6 (1946), 4 Ark. L. Rev. 475 095o), ai Tenn. L.
Rev. 198 (1950),
62 Hutchinson
zd 6, 9 (1946).
63 Ibid., at 496
64 Ibid., at 497

2 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 698 (1949).
v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 490, 495,
and 9.
and io.

65 Ibid., at 498 and lo.
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doing it. At least this is so where the doing of it will necessarily require time and
expense."; 66
(8) "In such a case it is but just to hold that the offeree's part performance
furnishes the 'acceptance' and the 'consideration' for a binding subsidiary promise not to revoke the offer, or turns the offer into67a presently binding contract
conditional upon the offeree's full performance.";
(9) This is the rule stated in Section 45 of the Restatement;
(io) "So our conclusion is that plaintiff's part performance of the consideration made this writing a contract binding defendant according to its terms.
This being so, he could not revoke it.";68
( i i ) The "contract continued in force during the 90 days stipulated. Upon a
sale within that period defendant became bound to pay plaintiff the commission,
as provided by the contract."; 69
(12) Defendant's insistence that plaintiff cannot recover because it did not
find a purchaser "overlooks the provision of the contract that defendant was to
pay plaintiff the commission in case of a sale within 90 days, regardless of who
made such sale." 70

The first nine points constitute what is believed to be the best judicial
exposition of the theory underlying Section 45 of the Restatement that
has appeared in the reports, but in Point i o, the court makes an unsound

application: the plaintiff in fact had not performed the act of finding a
buyer, and the plaintiff in fact had not given or tendered any part of
the consideration. The Restatement rewards performance, not effort.
The offeror's duty of immediate performance is conditional on the
full consideration being given or tendered. As far as the Restatement

provides, until the act of finding a buyer is performed, the agency and
its promises to pay commissions are all unbinding.
The third case is Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co.,71 decided in 1948

by the Superior Court of Delaware. Plaintiff was in the business of
buying baby chicks and raising them to broiler age. Defendant wrote
a letter to plaintiff containing a "blanket arrangement" whereby de-

fendant promised to buy broilers at ceiling prices. The court described
the letter as an offer for a unilateral contract, saying:
Plaintiff could have delivered 'broilers' or not, as he saw fit.... As long as the
offer remained open, Defendant was bound to accept and pay for such deliveries of 'broilers' as Plaintiff chose to make. Conversely, Defendant72was free at any
time to notify Plaintiff that its outstanding offer was cancelled.
Subsequently, plaintiff bought 7,000 baby chicks, raised them to
broiler age, and delivered them to defendant, who paid 2 2 -1 per pound
Ibid., at 498 and io.
68 Ibid., at 499 and io.
Ibid., at 498 and io.
69 Ibid., at 499 and IL.
7o Ibid., at 499 and t1.
71 44 Del. 513, 6z A. zd 243 (Super. Ct., 1948).
72 Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co., 44 Del. 513, 518, 6z A. ad 243, Z4r (1948).
66
67
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for them, which was less than the ceiling price referred to in the offer.
Plaintiff filed the present suit for the difference, and the case came up
on motions by the respective parties for summary judgment, both of
which were denied.
The controversy arises out of defendant's contention that the offer
was revocable and had been revoked in fact by a notification, prior to
the delivery of the broilers, that defendant would not pay ceiling prices.
The court said:
(i ) It is purely a question of law "whether or not the offer... constituted an
enforceable agreement at the moment Plaintiff, in reliance thereon, put in
'chicks' for future delivery to Defendant.... ,;7s
(a) Whether, "in a unilateral agreement of this sort, a promisor may cancel
his outstanding offer subsequent to partial performance on the part of
the
74
promisee is one of the most debatable subjects in the law of contracts.";
(3)"A study of the numerous text authorities and decisions convinces me
that there are but two approaches to the question (i) Regardless of the equities,
to apply strictly the principles of law peculiar to unilateral contracts-that is, to
treat them as offers calling for completed acts and, so long as the required act
remains but partially performed, then subject to the right of cancellation by the
offeror (2)To weigh the equities and, when the offeree has suffered a serious
detriment or disadvantage in undertaking, but has been unable to complete, the
performance sought by the offer, then, to treat the part performance by offeree
as giving rise to a consideration 7which
will convert the unilateral offer into an
5
enforceable, bilateral contract.";
(4)"Though a rare occurrence, to-day, the unilateral contract is clearly
recognized in our system of law."; 76
(5)"The substantial majority of the cases seem to treat a part performance
77
of a unilateral offer as though the acceptance of a bilateral agreement.";
(6) "After careful reflection I have concluded that a part performance of the
terms of a unilateral offer affords the consideration necessary to support a binding contract. While to some extent disturbing the ancient principles of law
applicable to unilateral offers, this result not only has the support of the weight
of authority but also is in accord with common principles of justice."; 78
(7)"Here, acting in reliance upon an unrevoked unilateral offer, Plaintiff
purchased and put into houses 7,000 baby 'chicks' for future delivery to Defendant, thereby incurring a substantial detriment. I am of the opinion that this
act constituted a part performance sufficient to convert the unilateral offer into
a binding, bilateral agreement from which Defendant could not extricate himself by the subsequent revocations ....-17
(8) "To summarize, Plaintiff, by partly performing Defendant's open offer
of November 8, 1944, converted it from a unilateral into a binding bilateral
agreement under which Defendant is liable unless, in fact, Defendant's revo-

cation of the offer ...
73

preceded the purchase of the 'chicks' here involved or,

Ibid., at 517 and 245.

74 Ibid.,

at 518 and 245.
5t8 and 246.
78 Ibid., at 519 and 246.
7.,Ibid., at

77 Ibid., at 522 and 247.
78 Ibid., at 522 and 247, 248.
79 Ibid., at 52z and 248.
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unless it should be hereafter found that Plaintiff agreed to the modification of
price.... ."80

Concerning the Abbott case the following points may be noted:
(i) it contains a straightforward presentation of the unilateral-offeryields-a-bilateral-contract theory, which, with very scanty discussion,
was the basis for the decision in Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire,8
(2) the court applied the theory, although the plaintiff's act of buying
the 7,000 chicks was not part performance of, but only preparation for,
the bargained-for act of delivering broilers, and (3) under Section 45
of the Restatement, the defendant's offer would have remained revocable until delivery or tender of at least some of the broilers.
Concerning the unilateral-offer-yields-a-bilateral-contract theory,
the following points may be noted: (i) the theory still clashes with
standard doctrine, (2) no case is known where a court has applied the
theory so as to hold that the off eree was bound as a promisor, (3) inasmuch as only the offeror has ever been held to be bound, the use of the
incongruous word "bilateral" has actually been obiter, and (4) if the
dicta, that the offeree is bound and that the liability is bilateral, were
deleted, the valid remainder of the theory would coincide closely with
Section 45 of the Restatement: the offeror could not revoke after performance or tender of part of the act-and, presumably, his duty of
immediate performance would be conditional upon full performance
by the offeree.
In the fourth case, an offer for a unilateral contract was squarely held
to have been accepted by a promise to do the act. The case is Cook v.
Johnson,s2 decided in 195 o , by the Supreme Court of Washington. A
full statement is in order:
December 20, 19 4 7-Defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff containing an offer
for a unilateral contract: a promise to pay for plaintiff's act of cleaning out and

extending the drainage ditch on defendant's ranch;
December 23, 19 47 -Plaintiff wrote a reply promising to do the work;
January 22, 194 8-Defendant sold the ranch to Fink on a conditional sales
contract, and Fink went into possession;
Shortly after-Plaintiff learned of the sale to Fink and of Fink's possession;

Early April, 194 8-Plaintiff moved his equipment to the ranch;
April 19 to May 19, I94 8-Plaintiff did the work;
Shortly after June i, x9 4 8-Plaintiff presented his bill to the defendant in the
amount of $1,790, a reasonable charge for the work done.
s0

Ibid., at

523

and

248.

81 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. to86 (19o2).
82 221 P. 2d 525 (Wash., 1950), 26

Wash. L. Rev.

227 (1951).
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The defendant refused to pay, and the plaintiff sued. The trial court
dismissed the action, but the supreme court reversed, with directions to
award judgment to plaintiff for the amount claimed, saying:
(i) "The law recognizes, as a matter of classification, two kinds of contractsbilateral and unilateral. A bilateral contract is one in which there are reciprocal
promises ....A unilateral contract is a promise by one party-an offer by him to

do a certain thing in the event the other party performs a certain act. The performance by the other party constitutes an acceptance of the offer and the
contract then becomes executed. Until acceptance by performance, the offer
may be revoked either by communication to the offeree or by acts inconsistent
with the offer, knowledge of which has been conveyed to the offeree."; 83
(z) When defendant made the offer to plaintiff, plaintiff "was not obligated
to perform. He could have accepted the offer by performance. But he went
further than that and promised to do the work. The promises of the two men
thereby became reciprocal and binding, each upon the other. The two letters
constitute a binding reciprocal agreement between the parties. There was a definite proposal by respondent which
was unconditionally accepted by appellant.
84
The minds of the parties met.";
(3)Plaintiff "did more than to indicate an intention to accept respondent's
offer by performance. He promised to do the work. His promise was just as
85
binding as that of the respondent.";
(4)Defendant contended that plaintiff's knowledge of Fink's purchase and
possession had the consequence that plaintiff "proceeded with the work at his
peril. That might have been true if the contract were unilateral. However, we
are here considering the reciprocal promises of the parties, each to the other-a
bilateral contract. It was respondent's duty, if he wished to be relieved of his
obligation to pay for the work, to contact appellant and attempt to have him
agree to a rescission."86

The following comments on the Cook case are offered:
(i) It is believed that this is the only reported case where a decision

was required to be made, and was made, on the precise point as to
whether an offer for a unilateral contract can or cannot be accepted by

a promise;
(2)
It is not necessary to guess at the court's meaning: the court explains the nature of bilateral and unilateral contracts and the nature of
an offer for a unilateral contract, and it then goes on to say that, while

the plaintiff could have accepted by performance, he actually made an
effective acceptance by a promise;

(3)The result is incompatible with the standard doctrine. Under
the standard doctrine, the promise was
ineffective as an acceptance
87
because it did not conform to the offer;
83Cook v. Johnson, 221 P. 2d 525, 527 (Wash.,

1950).

Ibid., at 527, 528.
85 Ibid., at 528.
86 Ibid., at 529.
87 Rest., Contracts § 59, illustration 2 (1932); 1 Williston, Contracts S§ 73, 75 (rev.
84
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(4)The holding that the offer had been accepted by the plaintiff's
promise is compatible with Llewellyn's suggestion that "it is not courts'
business to be looking for acts in contrast to promises or for promises
in contrast to acts. It is their business to be looking for overt expression
of agreement-any overt expression of agreement.18 8 An offer for a unilateral contract plus an "overt expression of agreement" in the form of
a promise to do the act, would result in a contract-a bilateral contract;
(5)The result was unfair to the defendant and gave to the plaintiff
a recovery to which he was not fairly entitled. Fink got the work, but
the plaintiff collected his pay from the defendant;
(6) It is true (and this may afford some comfort to a supporter of
Llewellyn's view) that the result would have been less unfair if the
court had applied the rule of damages, appropriate to a repudiated
bilateral contract, that a party may not recover for damage caused by
his own enhancement.89 The argument would be that the defendant's
sale to Fink was tantamount to a repudiation of his contract with the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff should not have started the work when
he knew that the defendant probably had no further interest in having
the work done and no wish to pay for it. When the plaintiff went
ahead, in disregard of the requirement that he mitigate damages, he
became entitled to recover only for the loss of profits and not for the
price of the work;
(7)A fair result would have been reached if the court had adhered
to the standard doctrine and had declared: (a) the defendant's offer
for a unilateral contract was not accepted by the plaintiff's promise to
do the work, (b) the defendant's offer was revoked when the plaintiff
learned of the sale to Fink and of Fink's possession,9" and (c) the plaintiff's performance of the work three months later gave him no rights
against the defendant.
V. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Section 2-2o6 of the Uniform Commercial Code91 contains provisions concerning mutual assent in unilateral contracts:
88

Llewellyn, op. cit. supra, note 54, at 803.

8

9Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F. zd 301 (C.A. 4 th, 1929); Rest.,
Contracts § 336 (1932); 5 Williston, Contracts §§ 1298-1300 (rev. ed, 1936).
90

Accord: Bancroft v. Martin, 144 Miss. 384,

109

So. 859 (926);

5 41 .(1932); 1 Williston, Contracts SS 57, 57 A (rev. ed., 1936).
91 Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition, Spring 1951.
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Section 2-2o6. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract.92
(i) Unless the contrary is unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shal be construed as inviting acceptance in
any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
can be accepted either by such shipment or by a prompt promise thereof.
(z) Unless the seller states the contrary a shipment sent in response to an
order to which it does not conform is an acceptance and at the same time a
breach. But a shipment of non-conforming goods offered as an accommodation
to the buyer in substitution for the goods described in the order is not an acceptance.
(3) The beginning of a requested performance can be a reasonable mode of
acceptance but in such a case an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within
a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.

Section 2-2o6 abolishes, to an extent, the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts for the sale of goods. Subsection (i) (a)
states that an offer may be accepted "in any manner and by any medium
reasonable in the circumstances." This provision may be construed to
mean that the offeree has the choice of accepting by making a promise
to perform, or by performing, the requested act, but, in any event,
Subsection (i ) (b) is specific to the effect that an offer to buy goods
for prompt or current shipment can be accepted by either the promise
or the act.
Subsection (z) is broader and permits acceptance by something
which is neither the promise to perform nor the requested act: acceptance occurs when nonconforming goods are shipped. The standard
doctrine is that a buyer's offer to pay for the act of shipping specified
goods can be accepted only by shipping those goods, but Subsections
(I) and (,) recognize three methods of acceptance: (a) by promising
to ship the goods, (b) by shipping goods which conform to the offer,
and (c) by shipping goods which do not conform to the offer.
Subsection (3) is narrower and provides that even the performance
of the requested act is not effective as an acceptance: under this rule, if
a buyer offers to buy goods to be made by the seller, the seller's beginning to make the goods would be an acceptance, but if the seller fails
to notify the buyer within a reasonable time, the seller cannot hold the
buyer even though he makes the goods exactly as requested-the buyer
may treat the previously accepted offer as having lapsed before it was
accepted. The concept, that an offer can be accepted and can there92 Williston's comments on Subsections i and 2 of this section appear in his article,
The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 I-arv. L. Rev. 561,

577 (1950).
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after be treated as having lapsed before it was accepted, is illogical beyond respect.
As far as unilateral contracts are concerned, the Uniform Commercial Code is not a codification of the common law. Indeed, the Code

has been analyzed as having quite a different character

"

The following theses, relating to the projet of the UCC, are ventured:
(2) The projet shows awareness of the technique of codification and legislation of the modern Roman law....
(3)Section 1-1o2.I,394 of the projet cautiously replaces the legal method of
the Anglo-American common law with the legal method developed in Roman
and modern Roman law, not only in regard to genuine interpretation, but also
in regard to the use of the code itself as a general source of law to solve new
problems....
VI. CONCLUSION

The post-Restatement period has been marked by a great increase in
the amount of judicial discussion on the subject of mutual assent in unilateral contracts. The discussion has been carried on in the terminology
of the standard doctrine as laid down in Williston on Contracts and the
Restatement, and, on the matters of knowledge of the offer, and intent
to accept, the standard doctrine has been stated and followed in outstanding cases.
A new doctrine has appeared in an important case, namely, that an
offer for a unilateral contract may be accepted by substantial performance of the act. This doctrine presents considerable difficulty, but
it may be a step in the common law development of the subject.
The problem of acceptance after revocation remains unsolved. The
solution presented in Section 45 of the Restatement has not received
support; four outstanding cases adopted four different analyses, running all the way from the standard doctrine that an offer can be
revoked until the act has been completed, to the extreme that it cannot
be revoked after the offeree has promised to perform the act.
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been said to have a
Roman law flavor, does not codify the common law as to unilateral
contracts for the sale of goods. Instead, the Code favors the idea that
an offer may be accepted by either performance or a promise to per93

Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Con-

temp. Prob. 330, 342 (1951).

94 The reference is to Section r-ioz of the Proposed Final Draft, Text and Comments
Edition, Spring 195o, entitled "Purpose and Construction." The section is greatly enlarged in the Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition, Spring 1951, and there bears
the tide "Purposes; Rules of Construction."
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form, and the Code thereby largely abolishes the distinction between
unilateral and bilateral contracts for the sale of goods.
If a single sentence can show the present state of the law, the following gem, cut and polished in 1949 by the very learned Circuit Judge
Swan, may do so:
The seller's shipment of the stamps in February 1944 was an acceptance of the
buyer's offer and created a unilateral contract which obligated the buyer to pay
in accordance with the terms of the contract. 95
S5 Moore v. Scott Stamp & Coin Co.,

178 F. ,d 3, 5 (CA. 2d, 1949).

